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Abstract—This work proposes and analyzes the use of
keystroke biometrics for content de-anonymization. Fake news
have become a powerful tool to manipulate public opinion,
especially during major events. In particular, the massive spread
of fake news during the COVID-19 pandemic has forced govern-
ments and companies to fight against missinformation. In this
context, the ability to link multiple accounts or profiles that
spread such malicious content on the Internet while hiding in
anonymity would enable proactive identification and blacklisting.
Behavioral biometrics can be powerful tools in this fight. In this
work, we have analyzed how the latest advances in keystroke
biometric recognition can help to link behavioral typing pat-
terns in experiments involving 100,000 users and more than
1 million typed sequences. Our proposed system is based on
Recurrent Neural Networks adapted to the context of content de-
anonymization. Assuming the challenge to link the typed content
of a target user in a pool of candidate profiles, our results show
that keystroke recognition can be used to reduce the list of
candidate profiles by more than 90%. In addition, when keystroke
is combined with auxiliary data (such as location), our system
achieves a Rank-1 identification performance equal to 52.6% and
10.9% for a background candidate list composed of 1K and 100K
profiles, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic is dominating worldwide
media. In an overconnected world fueled by global panic,
the propagation of fake news has achieved rates never seen
before. Many of these fakes are based on ridiculous statements
with scarce impact in a large percentage of the society (e.g.
drinking water kills the virus or cocaine cures the virus
[10, 28]). However, other fake news are more sophisticated
and employed to modify public opinion, propagate panic, and
destabilize governments.
The usage of fake news to manipulate public opinion has
become normal in recent years, especially when major events
such as elections and referendums take place. But during the
COVID-19 pandemic, the spread of massive quantities of fake
news has forced social media platforms to act. Companies
such as Facebook or Twitter are working harder to detect and
reduce the spread of fake news and bot profiles. Facebook
introduced for example a context option that provides back-
ground information for the sources of articles in its News Feed,
and Twitter has professional fact checkers to identify false
content [14, 22]. During the COVID-19 outbreak these fact
checkers detected anonymous profiles publishing fake news
that go directly against guidance from authoritative sources of
global and local public health information, aimed to influence
people into acting against recommended guidance [12].
Data re-identification or de-anonymization is the practice of
matching anonymous data with publicly available information,
or auxiliary data, in order to discover the individual to which
the data belongs to [20]. In the context of the fight against
fake news, de-anonymization is useful to link multiple profiles
belonging to the same user who is generating fake contents.
Once detected, these users can be blacklisted based on their
profile, MAC address, IP address, or other account data.
However, these safeguards can be circumvented by creating
a new account, changing device, or using a Virtual Private
Network (VPN). Biometric technologies such as keystroke
dynamics can be used to mitigate this circumvention. Data
de-anonymization can cover any type of data, from text to
audio, image, or video, being therefore a very challenging
task [3, 24, 26]. Popular examples in this line are DeepFakes,
which refer to deep learning based techniques able to create
fake videos by swapping the face of a person with the face of
another person [27]. In this work we focus in content that has
been typed using a traditional keyboard (i.e. text).
Keystroke biometric recognition enables the identification of
users based on their typing behavior. During the last 15 years,
the efforts of the keystroke biometrics scientific community
have been mostly focused on verification scenarios with a
limited number of users, typically less than several hundred.
The architecture proposed in [1], with experiments conducted
on over 100,000 users, opened new research opportunities
and challenges. The results over a user verification scenario
revealed the potential of scaling up keystroke recognition.
However, the suitability of this biometric trait for a large-scale
identification scenario remains unexplored in the literature.
This work presents a feasibility study of content de-
anonymization based on keystroke biometrics. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work that analyzes keystroke
identification for content de-anonymization. Our results sug-
gest the potential of keystroke identification as a tool to im-
prove the linkability between anonymous and verified profiles.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
summarizes the state of the art in keystroke recognition.
Sec. III defines the problem and presents the proposed system.
Sec. IV describes the experimental protocol, while in Sec. V
we present the results. Sec. VI discusses the limitations and
privacy concerns. Finally, Sec. VII draws the conclusions.
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Fig. 1. General architecture of our proposed de-anonymization approach evaluated in this work.
II. KEYSTROKE BIOMETRICS:
FROM FUNDAMENTALS TO THE STATE OF THE ART
Keystroke biometric systems are commonly placed into two
categories: fixed-text, where the keystroke sequence typed by
the user is prefixed, such as a username or password, and free-
text, where the keystroke sequence is arbitrary, such as writing
an email or transcribing a sentence with typing errors. Free-
text systems must therefore consider different text content be-
tween training and testing. Biometric recognition systems can
be applied for verification or identification task. Verification
implies a 1:1 comparison to determine if the biometric sample
belongs to the claimed identity. Identification implies 1:N
comparisons to determine the identity of the biometric sample
from a pool of candidates. Biometric authentication algorithms
based on keystroke dynamics for desktop and laptop keyboards
have been predominantly studied for verification tasks in fixed-
text scenarios, achieving accuracies higher than 95% [18, 19].
Approaches based on sample alignment (e.g. Dynamic Time
Warping) [18], Manhattan distances [15], digraphs [6], and
statistical models (e.g. Hidden Markov Models) [4] have
achieved the best results in fixed-text verification.
However, the performances of free-text algorithms are gen-
erally far from those reached in the fixed-text scenario, where
the complexity and variability of the text entry contribute
to intra-subject variations in behavior, challenging the ability
to recognize users [25]. Monrose and Rubin [17] proposed
a free-text keystroke algorithm based on user profiling by
using the mean latency and standard deviation of digraphs and
computing the Euclidean distance between each test sample
and the reference profile. Their results worsened from 90%
to 23% of correct classification rates when they changed both
users profiles and test samples from fixed-text to free-text.
Gunetti and Picardi [11] extended the previous algorithm to
n-graphs. They calculated the duration of n-graphs common
between training and testing and defined a distance function
based on the duration and order. Their results of 7.33%
classification error outperformed the previous state of the art.
Recently, some algorithms based on statistical models have
been shown to work very well with free-text, like the POHMM
(Partially Observable Hidden Markov Model) [16]. Perfor-
mance achieved using that approach in free-text is close to
fixed-text, but requires several hundred keystrokes and has
only been evaluated with a database containing less than 100
users. The latest advances in deep learning and the availability
of large scale databases has boosted the performance of
free-text keystroke recognition biometrics only very recently.
In [1], a Deep Recurrent Neural Network architecture was
presented with experiments over a database with 168,000
users and 136M keystrokes. Results obtained within a free-
text verification scenario achieved error rates under 5%. Nev-
ertheless, the performance of these algorithms for large scale
identification scenarios remains unknown. This is one of the
major contributions of this work.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A. Problem Statement
Anonymous content is re-identified when multiple anony-
mous profiles are linked or associated to a verified profile.
In our experiments, we assume that fake content was typed
by an anonymous user who authored other verified content
published on the same or different platform. A verified content
is defined in this work as a content associated to a real identity
(e.g. personal social media account or digital profile certified
by a third party). An anonymous content is defined as a
content published by one user who has not revealed his/her
real identity (i.e. this content is usually associated with an
alias or pseudonym).
In this work, we assume that timing sequences of the
keyboard were captured when typing. This can occur when
a user types content directly into a webpage. No special
permissions are required to record the timestamps of keyboard
input events generated on all major web browsers (e.g.,
Chrome, Firefox, Safari), and only the Tor Browser attempts
to obfuscate typing behavior by lowering timestamp resolution
[23]. De-anonymization is achieved by comparing the typing
characteristics of the anonymous and the verified contents
using the biometric patterns associated to the keystroke dy-
namics derived from these timing sequences. Fig. 1 presents
the architecture of our proposed approach. The Anonymous
typed content is first characterized according to the keystroke
dynamics xA (A for Anonymous) associated to the sequences
of time events t and keycodes k. A Recurrent Neural Network
is used to project the timing and keycode sequences into a
feature space trained for keystroke verification. The generated
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Fig. 2. Example of the 37 temporal features extracted from the term ”COVID-19”: 8 × Hold Time (tH) + 7 × Inter-key Latency (tIL), 7 × Press Latency
(tPL), 7 × Release Latency (tRL), 8 × key codes (k). P = key Press event; R = key Release event.
feature vector f(xA) is characterized by the individual typing
behavior of the anonymous subject. The feature vector f(xA)
is then matched with each of the i feature vectors f(xVi ) of
a Verified content database B (the “background”), composed
of N = #B profiles. The result of the matching process is
a ranked list with the N profiles ordered by similarity to the
anonymous subject.
B. Pre-processing and Keystroke Dynamics
The raw data captured in each keystroke sequence is
composed of a three dimensional time series including: the
keycodes, key press timestamps (corresponding to keydown
events), and key release timestamps (corresponding to keyup
events). In our experiments, timestamps were in UTC format
with millisecond resolution (captured in a web browser), and
the keycodes were integers between 0 and 255 according to
the ASCII code.
From this raw data, we extract 4 temporal features popular
in keystroke recognition (see Fig. 2 for details): (i) Hold Time
(tH): the elapsed time between press and release events; (ii)
Inter-key Latency (tIL): the elapsed time between releasing
a key and pressing the next key; (iii) Press Latency (tPL):
the elapsed time between two consecutive press events; and
Release Latency (tRL): the elapsed time between two consec-
utive release events. These 4 features are commonly used in
both fixed-text and free-text keystroke systems [5]. Finally, we
include the keycodes as an additional feature.
Let L be the length of the keystroke sequence. The keycode
and Hold Time features are calculated for each of the L keys in
the sequence, and latency features between consecutive keys
(tIL, tPL, and tRL) are calculated for the L − 1 consecutive
key pairs. This produces a time series with shape L × 2 +
(L − 1) × 3. All feature values are normalized before being
provided as input to the model. Normalization is important so
that the activation values of neurons in the input layer of the
network do not saturate (i.e. all close to 1). The keycodes are
normalized between 0 and 1 by dividing each keycode by 255,
and the 4 timing features are converted to seconds. This scales
most timing features between 0 and 1 as the average typing
rate over the entire dataset is 5.1 ± 2.1 keys per second. Only
latency features that occur either during very slow typing or
long pauses exceed a value of 1.
C. Recurrent Neural Network Architecture
We employ the Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) model
proposed in [1]. The model is composed of two Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) layers of 128 units. Between the
LSTM layers there are batch normalization and dropout layers
(0.5 drop rate) to avoid overfitting. Additionally, each LSTM
layer has a 0.2 recurrent dropout rate. The network was
trained with more than 1M keystroke sequences (over 50M
keystrokes) from 68,000 different users (see Sec. IV-B for
details).
The RNN was trained using a Siamese setup involving
two inputs: two keystroke sequences from either the same or
different users. During the training phase, the model learns the
projections necessary to discriminate whether two keystroke
sequences belong to the same user or not. The model acts
as a feature extractor and outputs an embedding vector that
contains the discriminating features (see [1] for details).
One constraint when training a RNN using standard back-
propagation through time applied to a batch of sequences is
that the number of elements in the time dimension (i.e. number
of keystrokes) must be the same for all sequences. We fix the
size of the time dimension to M . In order to train the model
with sequences of different lengths L within a single batch, we
truncate the end of the input sequence when L > M and zero
pad at the end when L < M , in both cases to the fixed size M .
Error gradients are not computed for zeroed elements, which
do not contribute to the loss function in the iterative learning
due to the Masking layer indicated in Fig. 1.
Finally, the output of the RNN model f(x) is an array of size
1× 128 that we consider later as an embedding feature vector
to identify anonymous content based on Euclidean distance.
IV. DATASET AND EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL
A. Dataset
All experiments were conducted with the Aalto University
Dataset [8] that comprises keystroke data collected from
Background content
Target user: Verified content
Target user: Anonymous content
Background content
Target user: Verified content
Target user: Anonymous content
Background content
Target user: Verified content
Target user: Anonymous content
Fig. 3. t-SNE projections of 30,000 embedding vectors from 2,000 users. Each projection is obtained from the embedding generated by the Recurrent Neural
Network. Each sub-figure contains the projections of the Anonymous and Verified keystroke sequences of a different target user. (Color image)
168,000 participants during a three-month time span. The ac-
quisition task required subjects to memorize English sentences
and then type them as quickly and accurately as they could.
The English sentences were selected randomly from a set
of 1,525 examples taken from the Enron mobile email and
Gigaword newswire corpora. The example sentences contained
a minimum of 3 words and a maximum of 70 characters. Note
that the sentences typed by the participants could contain more
than 70 characters as each participant could forget or add new
characters when typing.
For the data acquisition, the authors launched an online
application that recorded the keystroke data from participants
who visited their website and agreed to complete the acquisi-
tion task (i.e. the data was collected in an uncontrolled envi-
ronment). Press (keydown) and release (keyup) event timings
were recorded in the browser with millisecond resolution using
the JavaScript function Date.now. All participants in the
database completed 15 sessions (i.e. one sentence for each
session) on either a physical desktop or laptop keyboard.
The authors also reported demographic statistics: 72% of the
participants took a typing course, 218 countries were involved,
and 85% of the participants had English as native language.
B. Experimental Protocol
The RNN was trained using the first 68,000 users in the
dataset according to the method proposed in [1]. The size of
the time dimension M was fixed to M = 50, which is short
enough to consider small sentences. The remaining 100,000
users will be employed only to perform the evaluation of the
de-anonymization system, so there is no data overlap between
the two groups of users. Note that the model is unique for all
the 100,000 users in the evaluation set, and does not require
specific training when a new target user is added.
The 15 sequences from the 100,000 users in the database
were divided into two groups that simulate a de-anonymization
scenario: Verified (10 sequences) and Anonymous (5 se-
quences). We evaluated the de-anonymization accuracy by
comparing the Anonymous set of samples xAj,l, with l = 1, ..., 5
belonging to the user j against the Background Verified set
xVi,g , with g = 1, ..., 10 belonging to all 100,000 users. The
distance was computed by averaging the Euclidean distances
|| · || between each Verified embedding vector f(xVi,g) and each
Anonymous embedding vector f(xAj,l) as follows:
di,j =
1
10× 5
10∑
g=1
5∑
l=1
||f(xVi,g)− f(xAj,l)|| (1)
We then re-identify an anonymous profile (i.e. Anonymous
subject j = J is the same Verified person i = I) as follows:
I = argmin
i
di,J (2)
The results reported in the next section are computed in
terms of Cumulative Match Curve (CMC), which is a measure
of 1:N identification system performance. The curves are
calculated for each user and then averaged over all 100,000
users. A Rank-1 means that di,J < dI,J for any i 6= I , while
a Rank-n means that instead of selecting a single Verified
profile, we select n of them starting with i = I by increasing
distance di,J . In forensic scenarios, it is traditional to use
Rank-20, Rank-50, or Rank-100 in order to generate a short
list of potential candidates that are finally identified manually
using a bag of evidence.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Discriminatory Potential of Keystroke Biometrics
To ascertain the potential of the feature vectors generated by
the keystroke model, we applied the popular data visualization
algorithm t-SNE over the dataset. t-SNE is an algorithm to
visualize high-dimensional data. This algorithm minimizes the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between the joint probabilities
of the low-dimensional embedding and the high-dimensional
data. Fig. 3 shows the projection of the keystroke embedding
of three target users into a 2D space generated by the t-SNE
algorithm. t-SNE projection is an unsupervised algorithm but
for interpretation purposes we have colored three groups:
𝑁 = 1K (pre-screening)
𝑁 = 1K (all) 
𝑁 = 10K (pre-screening)
𝑁 = 10K (all) 
𝑁 = 100K (pre-screening)
𝑁 = 100K (all)
Fig. 4. CMC curves for different background sizes N = #B. Pre-screening
is based on the assumption that the location of the typist is available and can
be used to reduce the number of candidates in the background set.
• Background projections including embeddings of 30,000
keystroke sequences from 2,000 random users. These
sequences serve to visualize the boundaries and shape
of the feature space represented by t-SNE.
• Validated sequences (10 per user) typed by 3 target users
(each one in a different plot). These sequences model the
target user’s typing behavior.
• Anonymous sequences (5 per user) typed by the 3 target
users. These sequences serve to re-identify the target
users.
As we can see, the projections of the Validated and
Anonymous keystroke embeddings from the target users are
represented in close regions of the t-SNE space. Note that the
t-SNE projection is not trained using the labels (i.e. identity)
associated to each keystroke embedding. As a result, we
observe that the personal typing patterns from the target users
as represented by our deep network are discriminative enough
in this large background set of 30,000 different sequences.
These results suggest the discriminatory information available
in this biometric trait.
B. De-anonymization Accuracy
As a 1:N problem, the identification accuracy varies de-
pending on the size of the background set B. In our exper-
iments, the size of the background is equal to the number
of verified profiles available for the comparison. Fig. 4 and
Table I present the de-anonymization performance for different
background sizes. The results vary depending on the size of
the background, with Rank-1 identification accuracy varying
from 1.8% for the largest background (100K) to 26.4% for
the smallest one (1K). These accuracies can be considered low
for verification scenarios associated to user authentication. But
TABLE I
IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY (RANK-n IN %) FOR DIFFERENT
BACKGROUND SIZES N . IN BRACKETS ACCURACY WITH PRE-SCREENING
OF THE BACKGROUND DATASET BASED ON THE LOCATION OF THE TYPIST.
Rank Background Size N
N = 1K N = 10K N = 100K
Rank-1 26.4 (52.6) 8.1 (25.4) 1.8 (10.9)
Rank-50 95.9 (99.5) 59.2 (79.7) 21.8 (48.4)
Rank-100 98.9 (99.9) 73.1 (88.1) 31.3 (58.8)
Rank-1000 100 (100) 98.9 (99.7) 74.2 (89.4)
Rank-5000 − 99.9 (99.9) 96.1 (99.6)
in the context of profile de-anonymization, a 1.8% accuracy
among 100,000 profiles means that 1,800 profiles can be
automatically de-anonymized using only the keystroke patterns
of the owner. Rank-1 identification rate reveals the ability to
unequivocally identify the anonymous target profile among
all the verified profiles in the background set. Additionally,
Rank-n represent the achievable accuracy if we consider a
ranked list of n profiles from which the de-anonymization is
then manually or automatically conducted based on additional
evidence [9]. In general, the results suggest that keystroke de-
anonymization enables a 90% size reduction of the candidate
list while maintaining 100% accuracy (see the CMC curves in
Fig. 4).
The number of background profiles can be further reduced
if auxiliary data is available to realize a pre-screening of
the initial list of verified profiles (e.g. country, language).
The Aalto University Dataset contains auxiliary data including
age, country, gender, type of keyboard, and others. Fig. 4
and Table I show also user identification accuracy over the
entire background dataset with a pre-screening by country (i.e.,
contents generated in a country different to the country of
the target user are removed from the background set). The
results show that pre-screening based on a unique attribute
is enough to largely improve the identification rate: Rank-1
identification with pre-secreening ranges between 10.9% to
52.6%, while the Rank-100 ranges between 58.8% to 99.9%.
These results demonstrate the potential of keystroke dynamics
for de-anonymization when auxiliary information is available.
VI. LIMITATIONS AND PRIVACY ASPECTS
The results presented in this work are encouraging. How-
ever, there are still some limitations regarding the application
of this technology in the fight against fake news. The first
one is that content must be typed. Spread of news by retweet
or similar sharing mechanisms which do not require use of
the keyboard, are not detectable by this technology. Second,
bots are commonly employed for the propagation of fake
content. It is not clear how the method proposed in this
work would perform for synthetic behavior emulated by bots
[2]. Third, the identification performance decays for a large
number of background profiles. Therefore, pre-screening is
recommendable to reduce the candidate list.
On the other hand, biometric data is considered sensitive
data in a number of regulations (e.g. paragraph 71, EU GDPR).
Keystroke dynamics, as biometric data, must be processed
according to appropriate technical and organizational method-
ologies. The proposed de-anonymization based on keystroke
behaviors is a powerful tool that can help in the fight against
missinformation. But at the same time, the missuses of this
technology arise important concerns related to data protection
and user privacy. In addition to the identification accuracy
studied in the paper, a concrete application of the ideas
developed here should also consider and evaluate a secure
storage of the biometric templates, and other modules for
privacy preservation [7]. The balance is delicate in this case,
as we should aim to de-anonymize problematic subjects while
preserving the privacy rights and freedom of speech of the
overall population at the same time. Careful consideration of
such security and privacy aspects is out of the scope of the
present paper and can be investigated elsewhere [13, 21].
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work proposes keystroke biometric recognition for
typed content de-anonymization. The fight against missinfor-
mation requires new tools, and the COVID-19 pandemic has
showed the necessity to develop new technologies and policies
to reduce the spread of fake content. Keystroke recognition
can be used as a tool to link multiple profiles belonging
to the same typist based on his typing behavior. We have
evaluated a system based on Recurrent Neural Networks
in experiments involving 100,000 users and more than 1M
keystroke sequences. Our results suggest the potential of this
technology to link multiple texts typed by the same user by
leveraging personal typist patterns. The performance achieved
varies depending on the number of background profiles, with
Rank-1 identification accuracy ranging from 10.9% to 52.6%
and Rank-50 from 48.4% to 99.5 when auxiliary information
is available.
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